In this article I critically review the concept of the central executive. I argue that the experimental evidence for a central executive lacks rigor to the point where it is an unfalsifiable construct. I examine the neuropsychological and neuroradiological evidence and demonstrate that there is no localization evidence for a central executive. What emerges instead is a pattern of extensive heterogeneity with different executive tasks associated with different neural substrates. In sum it is argued that the idea of a central executive should be abandoned, and, from a neuropsychological perspective, tests that purport to measure executive function should do so in a qualitative way rather than assume that a range of tests load on a unitary dimension of performance. (JINS, 1998, 4, 518-522.) 
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing acceptance that the frontal lobes are best conceived of as an executive. The idea is perhaps a very old one, going back to Harlow's accounts of Phineas Gage and his inability to organize his life following the infamous tamping iron injury (Harlow, 1993) . However, in recent years the idea has become increasingly dominant, largely due to the widespread influence of Baddeley and Hitch's working memory model (Baddeley, 1986 (Baddeley, , 1990 Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) . Briefly, Baddeley and Hitch have proposed a model of memory in which there are two specific components (sometimes referred to as slave systems), a phonological loop, itself divided into two subcomponents, and a visuospatial system, held together by an attentional system termed the central executive. The specific components are rather modular in character in that they deal with specific inputs and outputs. In contrast, the central executive contains all other processes presumed to constitute working memory; it is the "overall controller, organiser, planner and allocator of resources" (Wilson et al., 1996, p. 20) .
The unified nature of the central executive is emphasized in diagrammatic depictions of working memory, where the executive component is inevitably shown as a large amorphous blob to which the specified components interact via information flow paths. Specification of the executive has led to the concept of a dysfunctional state known as the dysexecutive syndrome, which corresponds to the clinical picture long accepted as typical of frontal brain injury or disease. Thus the dysexecutive patient is easily distracted, disinhibited, poor at decision making, and unable to perform tasks that require any significant organization or planning (Baddeley, 1990; Wilson et al., 1996) .
Acceptance of the central executive as a single entity has led to the development of a test that purports to measure how efficiently it operates. The Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) test provides a range of assessments which, collectively, give rise to a screening score (Wilson et al., 1996) . The test comprises six tests measuring different aspects of frontal function; these include a test similar to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Nelson, 1976 ), a test resembling the Cognitive Estimation Test (Shallice & Evans, 1978) , and a test measuring the same ability as that tapped by the Trail Making Test. In addition there are three planning tests including a version of the Six Elements Task (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) . Performance on each of these is then collated and a screening score produced resulting in a classification ranging from impaired to very superior executive function.
My reason for introducing BADS is to show that, among some neuropsychologists, there is an acceptance that the central executive is a single entity and, what is more, one can actually measure how well it operates. In opposition to this I will show that the pervasive use of the term central executive resides in the absence of any good scientific proof that it exists, and that its value as a construct in psychology and neuropsychology is severely limited.
ARGUMENTS FOR A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
Within the human experimental literature there seems little in the way of good evidence for a central executive. In working memory research the central executive's function is typically defined in terms of those aspects of performance that cannot be attributed to one or other of the operationally defined slave systems. In an early and influential study, for example, it was shown that a certain level of digit preload did not interfere with memory performance, but, as the load increased, there was a drop in performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) .
The logic applied was that the absence of a difference at certain levels of digit preload indicated that the phonological subsystem could handle the preload; but when larger loads were given, the central executive's resources were partly required to maintain the preload, and thus other aspects of performance were disrupted. Thus the role of the central executive in task performance is effectively defined by default: that is, the point at which one cannot attribute participants' performance to the phonological loop.
A similar explanatory approach is used in studies of the central executive involvement in reading. Oakhill et al. (1986) , for example, were interested in the involvement of the central executive in the reading of children who were good and bad comprehenders. It was shown that good and poor comprehenders did not differ in the extent to which they showed a word length effect-a phenomenon assumed to be dependent on the phonological subsystem. As a result it was argued, again by default, that the locus of the comprehension deficit was within the central executive. Experiments of the above type make it difficult to use the central executive idea as a predictive theoretical construct. Rather, the central executive becomes implicated in explaining task performance when neither of the operationally defined slave systems can be invoked in explaining data. This lack of rigor has led at least one author to argue that "the concept of a central executive has yet to be elaborated in any way that avoids the homunculus problem, namely the problem of practically unconstrained explanatory powers. As a consequence the idea has yet-to my knowledge-to generate specific, hypothesis testing research" (Allport, 1993, pp. 200-201) .
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
In his account of the central executive, Baddeley leans very much on neuropsychological evidence, and crucial to this has been the use of Norman and Shallice's Supervisory Activating System (SAS) theory as a basis for specifying the executive component of working memory (Norman & Shallice, 1986) . Briefly, Norman and Shallice propose that actions can be controlled in two ways. Well learned routines such as driving occur largely automatically, and when two routine behaviors are competing the mechanism of contention scheduling prioritizes one over the other. The SAS component comes into operation when routine actions are insufficient and conscious intention redirects behavior. Thus the SAS would take over responding in situations involving problem solving and decision making. Baddeley (1990) is clear in his use of the SAS concept as a means of inducing a homuncular component to working memory, attributing to it the reintroduction of the will as a respectable concept in cognitive psychology.
The SAS is assumed to reside in the frontal lobes on the grounds that two classic symptoms of frontal lobe damageperseveration and distractibility-can be readily attributed to a dysfunction of the SAS. Perseveration, as measured by errors on tasks such as the WCST, arises because the SAS is unable to interrupt an established response to enable a new one to be produced. Distractibility, in its various guises, arises because the normal inhibition imposed by the SAS to prevent responses to extraneous stimuli is impaired. With respect to memory, Shallice has extended the idea to argue that the SAS is involved in the retrieval of memories in two ways. First, reflecting the fact that retrieval is essentially a reconstructive process, the SAS is implicated in specifying descriptions of potential memories. Second, the SAS is also responsible for verifying the truth of memories. Memory deficits arising from SAS impairment include an impairment of recall due to impaired specification of descriptions and a tendency towards false memory characterized, in the extreme, by confabulation and, less drastically, by the generation of high levels of false alarms on recognition tests. In his own discussion of the central executive, Baddeley takes a similar line, noting that confabulation is due to "a combination of poor memory and lack of adequate attentional control of working memory, a deficit in the central executive" (Baddeley, 1990, p. 318) .
Unfortunately further examination of the frontal lobe literature sits uneasily with the idea that there is a single executive governing different aspects of performance subsumed under the rather loose definition of "attentional control." First, as Shallice (1988) has pointed out, there is nonequipotentiality in the frontal cortex for different types of tasks. Thus the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) subsumes performance on tasks such as WCST, delayed matching to sample, and tasks that require resistance to distractibility. In contrast the orbitofrontal regions appear implicated in the inhibition of well established response patterns. Eslinger and Grattan (1993) made a distinction between what they termed tests of spontaneous and reactive fluency. Tests of spontaneous fluency include the FAS test and the Alternative Uses Test, whereas reactive fluency is typically measured with WCST. Eslinger and Grattan argued for the separability of these functions on the grounds that they had differing neural substrates. We have followed up these findings by looking at the relationship between different measures of frontal lobe function in samples of elderly individuals. It is well established that performance on tests of frontal lobe function declines markedly with age, thus making this an appropriate group within which to observe potential dissociations in impaired performance. The data are very clear in showing that tests of reactive fluency do not correlate with tests of spontaneous fluency, and that an additional frontal factor involving spatial working memory can also be identified (Loveday, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Parkin et al., 1995) .
In his recent critique Allport (1993) considers the case of E.V.R. as evidence against the idea of a central executive (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) . Briefly, E.V.R. had pathological decision making processes involving social situations but performed normally on clinical measures of frontal function. While one could argue for yet another frontal function involving social planning, there is a confound in that E.V.R. is of above average intelligence. Normal performance on frontal lobe tests in the presence of disordered social existence has been observed a number of times but always in the context of high IQ (Goldstein et al., 1993) In these cases, at least, one might argue that task sensitivity underlies the paradox.
Functional neuroimaging studies also support nonequipotentiality of frontal function. Roland (1985) , for example, identified three different patterns of frontal activation associated with different aspects of attention: task preparation, selective attention, and temporal sequencing. Deiber et al. (1991) implicated areas of the anterior cingulate gyrus and the supplementary motor area in the initiation of voluntary movements. Bench et al. (1993) showed that the Stroop Test gives rise to various patterns of activation in the right frontal cortex. Baker et al. (1996) carried out a detailed evaluation of the Tower of London task and found a complex pattern of activation. Their conclusions, based on their own and other studies, is that performance of the Tower of London involves three components: "(a) a rostral prefrontal area engaged in sequence selection and evaluation; (b) a system for representation of intermediate problem states in visuospatial working memory, comprising the DLPFC, posterior parietal and extrastriate visual cortices; and (c) a system for their manipulation and the direction of attention comprising inferior frontal, premotor and anterior cingulate cortices" (pp. 520-521).
The Baker et al. study shows that, in a task with three cognitive components, there appears to be three different patterns of frontal activation, thus arguing against a common control element supervising overall performance. There is also evidence that some tasks with an obvious executive element do not load directly on frontal function at all. Alivisatos and Petrides (1996) examined regional blood flow while subjects performed two mental rotation tasks, either deciding whether pairs of alphanumeric stimuli were accurate mirror images of one another, or deciding whether two stimuli, one of which was rotated from upright, were the same or different. Mental rotation is held as one of the tasks that would involve an interaction between the visuospatial scratchpad (within which rotation of the internal percept would occur) and the central executive. The results showed that both tasks produced increased activation in right posterosuperior parietal cortex and the left inferior parietal cortex, but no evidence of significant frontal activity.
Interestingly there is evidence of fractionation in the BADS test. Along with the six tests there is also a questionnaire about dysexecutive function (DEX) which reveals three factors in patients' responses: behavior (e.g., impulsive acts), cognition (e.g., mixing up events), and emotion (e.g., lethargy). This fits nicely with arguments developed here because one would not expect this factoring if a single executive deficit was being measured. It would be interesting to examine the relationships between the other tests comprising BADS.
Evidence from split brain patients also has some bearing on this issue. There has been considerable evidence concerning the nature of attentional mechanisms in the split brain: in particular, whether a unitary attentional mechanism oversees the hemispheres (as one might expect from a central executive view), or whether each hemisphere has its own attentional system. The evidence is mixed. On tasks that do not require a response at the symbolic level (e.g., attention to location) the data are consistent with a unitary mechanism mediated by subcortical structures (Holtzman, 1984) . In contrast, tasks that require attention to symbolic information (e.g., visual target search) show evidence for separate attentional mechanisms in each hemisphere (Luck et al., 1994) .
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF MEMORY
One of the most important discoveries to emerge from functional neuroimaging studies of memory has been the implication of the frontal lobes in memory performance. However, there is no evidence of equipotentiality of activation across tasks. A number of studies have shown that on tests measuring retrieval there is primarily activation of the right frontal cortex, whereas tasks assessing encoding factors give rise to left frontal activation (Fletcher et al., 1995; Kapur et al., 1994; Tulving et al., 1994) . If a single executive were initiating both encoding and retrieval, as depicted in the working memory model, then one would expect to see some common pattern of activation. A similar conclusion emerges from work by Petrides and his colleagues involving functional localization and working memory (Petrides et al., 1993) . They compared the pattern of brain activation occurring during performance of a conditional associative learning task and the self ordered pointing task. In the conditional associative learning task subjects viewed eight symbols, each of which was pre-experimentally associated with a different color. On a test trial participants were presented with the eight symbols plus a single color and required to name the appropriate symbol. Performance of this task resulted in activation of the posterior dorsolateral frontal cortex. In the self-ordered pointing task the same eight symbols are presented on each trial and the participant must point at a dif-ferent one each time. On this task activation centered on the middorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Both of these tasks indisputably rely on a putative central executive, and given their similarity one might well have expected common activation stemming from the shared executive component. The absence of any common activation thus poses difficulties for any notion of a unitary central executive.
The dissociation of frontal memory phenomena is also supported by the case study literature. Hanley et al. (1994) reported a patient with a caudate lesion who showed a profound impairment of recall in the presence of normal recognition memory. In contrast several authors have reported patients who show high levels of false alarms in recognition and intrusions in free recall (Delbecq-Derousne et al., 1990; Parkin et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1996) . The tempting explanation of this is that the former patient suffers from some impairment in generating descriptions, while the latter have a verification impairment. This may well be correct and offers good dissociative evidence for Shallice's (1988) proposal and no support for unitary executive control over memory.
CONCLUSIONS
Summing up one can conclude the following. The central executive is a concept that emerges from research by default when more rigorous theoretical constructs cannot handle the data. From the neuropsychological evidence one can state, unequivocally, that there is no evidence of a single brain region consistently associated with tasks assumed to measure executive function. This applies both from lesion studies and functional neuroimaging studies. Rather there is quite cleary an extremely varied state of affairs with different executive tasks subsumed by different neural substrates. On the basis of these findings, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accept the idea of a central executive as defined by the working memory model. Instead, it appears that there is no single controlling resource, and that different executive tasks involve nonoverlapping control processes. It is typical of psychology that a seemingly simple situation becomes more complex with further thought and investigation. Thus it should be no surprise that our explanations of the most complex part of the brain should take a similar course (for alternatives to the executive idea see GoldmanRakic, 1987; Kimberg & Farah, 1993) . The central executive idea is attractive partly because it embodies the ideas of volition and consciousness in the determination of behavior. Consciousness and volition may well be valid constructs, but if so, they must emerge from the coactivity of many different systems. There is no evidence that they emanate from a single brain region with homuncular qualities.
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